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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, j 
vs. j 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES, i 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
i Case No. 950384-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court 
criminat action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital 
felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in allowing the non-expert 
testimony of Ragan to authenticate the alleged letters written by 
Jacques? 
A trial court's determination of legal questions is reviewed 
for "correctness." State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
However, a trial court's application of a given set of facts to a 
particular legal rule is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-39 (Utah 1994). A 
trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is beyond the 
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limits of reasonableness or if the actions of the judge are 
inherently unfair. State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 
1994), State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved by Jacques' oral objection at trial 
(3/14/95 Tr. at 89-90) and by his written post-trial motion for 
arrest of judgment (R. 281-284) argued at sentencing (4/19/95 
Tr.). 
2. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support 
the verdict? 
The appropriate standard of review for this issue is: 
"[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be 
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Dunn, 208 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 100 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved by Jacques' motion for arrested 
judgment and acquittal (R. 281-84) and at the sentencing hearing 
(4/19/95 Tr.). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1994): 
(4) Prohibited Acts D—Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and 
intentionally: 
2 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to 
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order under the terms of this chapter. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-25-9 (1992): 
Any writing may be proved either: 
(1) by any one who saw the writing executed; or 
(2) by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting 
of the maker; or 
(3) jjy
 a subscribing witness. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901 (1995): 
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence that the matter in question is what 
its propenent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by 
way of limitation, the following are examples of 
authentication or identification conforming with the 
requirements of this rule: 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert 
opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based 
upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the 
litigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Defendant, Marvin Jean Jacques, was convicted by jury in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court on March 15, 1995, of making or 
uttering a forged prescription, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii). On April 
19, 1995, Jacques was sentenced by Judge Guy R. Burningham to the 
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Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years (R. 304-05). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition 
Marvin Jean Jacques was charged by information filed on 
November 1, 1994, with making or uttering a forged prescription 
for a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (R. 1). Prior to 
preliminary examination, Jacques filed with the Fourth Circuit 
Court, Spanish Fork Department: a motion for discovery (R. 17-
18), a motion to suppress the photo line-up (R. 15-16), and a 
motion demanding a speedy trial (R. 12-13). 
A Preliminary Hearing was held in this matter on November 
28, 1994 (R. 29-31). Prior to commencement of the hearing, and 
at Jacques' request, the circuit court appointed the Utah County 
Public Defenders Association as advisory counsel only and ordered 
that Jacques would act as his own legal counsel (R. 22-23). 
Following the Preliminary Hearing, Jacques was bound-over to 
the Fourth District Court on the charge (R. 33). At an 
arraignment held in district court on December 7, 1994, the 
Honorable Guy R. Burningham presiding, Jacques entered a plea of 
"not guilty" to the charge (R. 36-37). 
Prior to trial, Jacques filed with the district court a 
motion in limine with regards to prior convictions (R. 58-59) and 
a motion to suppress witness identification evidence (R. 40-46, 
60-62). On February 2 and 10, 1995, an evidentiary hearing was 
conducted before Judge Burningham on Jacques' pre-trial motions 
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and on his objection to the State's request that he submit a 
hand-writing sample for analysis. 
At the close of the evidentiary hearing Judge Burningham: 
denied Jacques' motion respecting a speedy trial; granted 
Jacques' motion to suppress the photo line-up; granted Jacques' 
motion to suppress post photo line-up identification evidence of 
witnesses Valarie Seitz, Peggy Wiscombe, and Ryan Ollerton; 
denied Jacques' motion to dismiss; and overruled Jacques' 
objection to the State's request for a hand-writing sample (R. 
175-76, 186-87, 202-05). 
On March 14-15, 1995, a jury trial was held in this matter 
with Judge Burningham presiding and Jacques appearing, pro se 
(R. 272-276). Jacques was convicted by the jury on March 15, 
1995 (R. 270). After trial, Jacques filed with the district 
court a motion to arrest judgment and a motion for acquittal (R. 
281-84). Both motions were denied by Judge Burningham and 
Jacques was sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to five 
years at the Utah State Prison (R. 304-05). 
After an Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time of Appeal was 
granted by the district court (R. 308-09), a Notice of Appeal was 
filed on June 2, 1995, by the Utah County Public Defenders 
Association on behalf of Jacques and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On September 27, 1994, a black man entered the Art City 
Pharmecy in Springville, Utah with a prescription for "percoceth" 
for "James Brooks" signed by "Dr. Darrel Olson" (3/14/95 Tr. at 
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42-47, 48-50). 
Valorie Seitz, an employee at the Art City Pharmecy, 
testified that she was working at the pharmecy on September 27, 
1994, when a black man—who she thought was approximately 6'2" 
tall—came in with a prescription signed by a Dr. Darrel Olson to 
be filled for James Brooks (3/14/95 Tr. at 44-45). Seitz 
testified that she became suspicious that the prescription was 
forged because the requested drug, percocet, was misspelled as 
"percoceth" so she asked the pharmecist to examine it (3/14/95 
Tr. at 44). The pharmecist tried to call the doctor while the 
man waited. Id. At some point the police were called, but the 
man left before they arrived and without receipt of the 
prescribed medication (3/14/95 Tr. at 45). 
Ryan Ollerton, another employee at the Art City Pharmecy, 
was also working on September 27, 1994. Ollerton testified that 
while working on that day he became aware that someone was trying 
to pass a forged prescription (3/14/95 Tr. at 48). Ollerton 
testified that the alleged suspect was a black man, and that 
Ollerton followed him out of the store and saw the man get in a 
cherry red sports car (3/14/95 Tr. at 49). Ollerton also 
testified that while he was unsure of either the exact make of 
the car or its license plate number, he thought that it looked 
similar to the red car owned by Jacques which was admitted as 
State's Exhibit 2 (3/14/95 Tr. at 49-50, 51, 52-58). 
The prescription was written on an IHC prescription pad and 
was signed by a Dr. Darrel Olson (State's Exhibit 1). Dr. Darrel 
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Olson, a physician employed by IHC in their Nephi, Ephraim, and 
Mt. Pleasant clinics, testified that neither the handwriting nor 
the signature on the prescription belonged to him and that he 
never authorized anyone else to write his signature on the 
prescription (3/14/95 Tr. at 29). Olson also testified that all 
three IHC clinics which he works at use the same prescription pad 
and that Dr. Kim Bateman was one of his partners (3/14/95 Tr. at 
30). Olson further testified that patients were frequently left 
unsupervised in the clinics and would have access to prescription 
pads which were often left out in the examining rooms (3/14/95 
Tr. at 31-32). 
Dr. Kim Bateman, a partner of Olson's at the same IHC 
clinics, identified Jacques at trial and testified that he had 
examined Jacques' knee at the Ephraim clinic on September 26, 
1994, and gave Jacques a prescription for a non-narcotic pain 
medication (3/14/95 Tr. at 70-73). Bateman also testified that 
he had treated Jacques three times, that Jacques was left alone 
in the examination room in Ephraim on September 26, 1994 (3/14/95 
Tr. at 73). In addition, Bateman testified that he was familiar 
with Olson's handwriting and that neither the handwriting nor the 
signature on the prescription in question were Olson's (3/14/95 
Tr. at 69). 
Prior to trial, Jacques was ordered by the trial court to 
provide a handwriting sample to the State for analysis (R. 202, 
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State's Exhibit 3).1 Alan Tipton, an officer with the 
Springville Police Department, testified that he administered and 
witnessed Jacques take the requested handwriting sample (3/14/95 
Tr. at 54-55). Tipton also testified that he sent the 
prescription to the state crime lab to be tested for latent 
prints, and that the two comparable latent prints did not match 
Jacques' prints (3/14/95 Tr. at 55). 
At trial, the State sought to introduce letters and court 
pleadings allegedly written by Jacques. Sherry Ragan, another 
deputy Utah County attorney, was called to identify and 
authenticate these writings as a nonexpert under Rule 901 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Included in these writings were: State's 
Exhibit 4—an envelope allegedly written by Jacques and addressed 
to David Cole; State's Exhibit 9—a letter allegedly written by 
Jacques to Cole; State's Exhibit 10—portions of a letter 
allegedly written by Jacques to Ragan; and several pleadings also 
allegedly written by Jacques that had been filed with the trial 
court (State's Exhibits 12, 14, 16, 17). 
Ragan first testified outside the presence of the jury 
that she had prosecuted Jacques 2-3 times, that in the course of 
those prosecutions she had seen his handwriting on letters and 
other court documents, and that in her opinion the handwriting on 
State's Exhibits looked like Jacques writing. (3/14/95 Tr. at 80-
89). Jacques objected to her "familiarity" with his handwriting 
throughout the proceedings, Jacques represented himself and 
David Cole, a deputy Utah County attorney, represented the State. 
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because she had never witnessed him write and therefore she 
couldn't be sure that the writing was his, and because she was 
also a prosecutor whose opinion would be biased (3/14/95 Tr. at 
89-90). The trial court ruled that Ragan was competent to give a 
nonexpert opinion on handwriting under Rule 901, that the letters 
and documents were written by Jacques, and that they would be 
admitted into evidence under the residual hearsay exception under 
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (3/14/95 Tr. at 91, 102, 
92-95). 
Before the jury, Ragan testified that she was a local 
attorney who has known Jacques for 6-7 years (3/14/95 Tr. at 150-
51). Ragan also testified that in that period she has seen 4-5 
pieces of handwriting which she believed to be Jacques (3/14/95 
Tr. at 51. More specifically, Ragan testified that Exhibit 10 
was from a letter she received from Jacques, that Exhibits 4 and 
9 looked similar to Exhibit 10 and other pieces of Jacques 
writing she had seen—although these exhibits were written to 
Cole, and that she believed the handwriting on the copies of the 
court documents—Exhibits 12, 14, 16, and 17—to be the same 
writing as Jacques (3/14/95 Tr. at 51-53). 
Chuck Senn, an officer with the Springville Police 
Department, was also called by the State to testify as a 
handwriting expert (3/14/95 Tr. at 108-149). Senn testified that 
in the course of his analysis he was able to locate 32 points of 
identification from State's Exhibit 1—the prescription—with 
which to compare Jacques' submitted handwriting sample (Exhibit 
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3) as well as the letters and documents which Ragan authenticated 
(Exhibits 4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17) (3/14/95 Tr. at 123). 
Senn testified that, although he believed Jacques' 
handwriting sample to be faked, he found 18-20 points of common 
identification between the prescription and Jacques' handwriting 
sample which led him to the conclusion that both documents were 
written by the same individual (3/14/95 Tr. at 132-33, 148). 
However, all of the points of common identification Senn 
showed to the jury during the course of his testimony came from 
the writings authenticated by Ragan (3/14/95 Tr. at 123-32). 
Senn testified that in comparing the prescription with Exhibits 
4, 9, and 10, he was able to find all 32 points of identification 
and that therefore, all four documents were written by the same 
person (3/14/95 Tr. at 131-32, 134). 
After Jacques was convicted by the jury, he filed with the 
trial court a motion for arrested judgment and a motion for 
acquittal on the grounds that the trial court erred in allowing 
Ragan to testify as a nonexpert under Rule 901 and that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Both of 
Jacques' motions were denied and he was sentenced to prison on 
April 19, 1995 (4/19/95 Tr.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Jacques asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding deputy county attorney Sherry Ragan 
competent to render nonexpert opinion on handwriting under Rule 
901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Ragan had never witnessed 
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Jacques write, which Jacques argues is the threshold of 
sufficiency under State v, Freshwater, 85 P. 447 (Utah 1906). 
Furthermore, Ragan's only familiarity with Jacques' writing not 
gained or acquired for purposes of this litigation concerned a 
single letter she allegedly received from Jacques, Jacques 
maintains that such familiarity is insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 901 and State v. Freshwater. Moreover, the 
trial court erred in allowing Ragan to testify concerning 
documents allegedly written by Jacques during the course of this 
litigation. Rule 901(b)(2) clearly indicates that a nonexperts 
familiarity with handwriting is not to be acquired for purposes 
of the litigation. Therefore, Jacques asks that this Court 
vacate his conviction. 
Point II. Jacques argues that the evidence introduced by 
the State at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was the person who committed the crime for which he 
was convicted. Therefore, Jacques asks this Court to reverse his 
conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
SHERRY RAGAN TO AUTHENTICATE WRITINGS AS A NONEXPERT 
UNDER RULE 901 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
At trial Jacques was convicted of uttering a forged 
prescription. Prior to trial a handwriting sample was taken from 
Jacques and given to Chuck Senn, a handwriting expert, for 
analysis (3/14/95 Tr. at 54-55, 108-49). In addition to the 
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sample, a letter written to deputy county attorney Sherry Ragan 
(Exhibit 10), an envelope addressed to prosecuting attorney David 
Cole (Exhibit 4), a letter written to David Cole (Exhibit 9), and 
several court documents (Exhibits 12, 14, 16, 17)—all allegedly 
written by Jacques—were also given to Senn for comparison with 
the prescription (Exhibit 1) (3/14/95 Tr. at 108-149). 
At trial Ragan's testimony was used to authenticate or 
identify the letters under Rule 901(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Jacques asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in allowing Ragan to given nonexpert opinion on 
handwriting at trial. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-25-9 states: "Any writing may be 
proved either: (1) by any one who saw the writing executed; or 
(2) by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the 
maker; or (3) by a subscribing witness. 
Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that the 
requirement of authentication or identification of evidence prior 
to admission may be satisfied by evidence "sufficient to support 
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims." Rule 901(a), U.R. Evid. Rule 901(b)(2) provides the 
example of authentication or identification for nonexpert 
opinions on handwriting; it reads: "Nonexpert opinion as to the 
genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired 
for purposes of the litigation." 
This subsection was adopted in accordance with State v. 
Freshwater, 85 P. 447 (Utah 1906). See, Rule 901 Advisory 
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Committee Note. The relevant issue in Freshwater was whether the 
trial court erred in allowing a nonexpert, who had seen the 
defendant write only once, to testify that the handwriting on the 
envelope of a letter addressed to her was the defendant's 
writing. 
The Utah court held that such a writing may be proved by 
such a witness who has seen the defendant write even one time. 
Freshwater, 85 P. at 448. In its opinion the Freshwater court 
quoted "It has from early times been settled that no great degree 
of familiarity with handwriting is required to render a witness 
competent to give an opinion. If he has seen the person write a 
single time, it has generally been held sufficient" (citations 
omitted). Id. 
At issue in this case is whether a nonexpert, who has never 
seen the defendant write, can nonetheless authenticate or 
identify his handwriting in accordance with Rule 901(b)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. At trial Ragan admitted that she had 
never actually witnessed Jacques writing (3/14/95 Tr. at 89). 
While Freshwater indicates that "no great degree of familiarity 
with handwriting is required to render a witness competent to 
give an opinion," Jacques asserts that the threshold of 
sufficiency under Freshwater and Rule 901 is that the nonexpert 
witness has seen the person write—even if only once. 
Moreover, Ragan herself was in receipt of only one letter 
allegedly written to her by Jacques (Exhibit 10, 3/14/95 Tr. at 
81). The other writings authenticated or comparitively 
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identified by Ragan were a letter sent to the prosecuting 
attorney, David Cole (Exhibit 9), an envelope addressed to David 
Cole (Exhibit 4), and court documents allegedly written by 
Jacques that were filed during the course of this case (Exhibits 
12, 14, 16, 17) (3/14/95 Tr. at 8-11, 82-83). 
Jacques asserts that Ragan's knowledge or familiarity of 
Jacques' writing is insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 
901. She only testified to receiving one document allegedly 
written by Jacques. In addition, her "familiarity" with regards 
to all of the other writings—whose genuineness she rendered an 
nonexpert opinion about—was acquired for purposes of this 
litigation. The letter and envelope addressed to David Cole as 
well as the court pleadings were all written during the course of 
this litigation. Rule 901(b)(2) clearly states that the required 
familiarity necessary for nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness 
of handwriting must not acquired for purposes of the litigation. 
Jacques maintains that the trial court erred in allowing 
Ragan to render nonexpert opinion about her familiarity with 
writings filed in the course of this litigation. Moreover, 
Jacques also asserts that the only writing whose familiarity was 
not acquired for purposes of the litigation was the one letter 
she herself had received. Jacques maintains that familiarity of 
one letter is insufficient under Freshwater and Rule 901 to 
render her competent to render nonexpert opinion—particularly 
where she has never witnessed or seen Jacques write. 
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Thereforef Jacques requests that this Court find that the 
trial court abused its discretion in finding Ragan competent to 
testify under Rule 901. Jacques also asks this Court to vacate 
his conviction because of the inherent unfairness created by the 
trial court's decision to allow Ragan, a deputy county attorney, 
to give a nonexpert opinion on Jacques' handwriting based on one 
letter she received and other writings filed or received in the 
course of this case. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL HAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
In order to convict a criminal defendant the State must 
prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Jacques asserts that the State failed to meet its burden 
and therefore his conviction should be reversed. 
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 
Jacques carries a heavy burden. He "must marshal all evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict and must then show how this 
marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State 
v. Lemon, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
Jacques must demonstrate that the evidence is "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Dunn, 208 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 100 (Utah 1993). 
Jury instruction #4 lists the essential elements of making 
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or uttering a forged prescription in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (R. 266). Those elements, which 
each must be established by the State by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt are: "1. That the Defendant; 2. on or about 
September 27, 1994; 3. in Utah County, Utah; 4. knowingly and 
intentionally; 5. did make or utter; 6. a false or forged 
prescription or written order; 7. for a controlled substance." 
Jacques argues that the State failed to prove element #1—his 
identity in connection with the charge—beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Jacques has marshalled all of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict in his statement of facts. 
However, Jacques will likewise marshal here the evidence that is 
relevant to his sufficiency argument. 
Dr. Bateman, identified Jacques and testified that he had 
examined Jacques on September 26, 1994, at the IHC clinic in 
Ephraim, Utah, for a sprained knee (3/14/95 Tr. at 70-73). 
Bateman also testified that Jacques was left unattended in an 
examinating room and that it was common for prescription pads to 
be found in plain view in such an examining room (3/14/95 Tr. at 
70, 73). 
Dr. Olson, whose name was signed on the prescription, 
testified that he never wrote or signed such a prescription for 
"James Brooks" nor did he authorize anyone else to issue such a 
prescription (3/14/95 Tr. at 29). 
Valorie Seitz and Ryan Ollerton, both employees at the Art 
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City Pharmecy, both testified that a "black man" came to the 
pharmecy on September 27, 1994 (3/14/95 Tr. at 44-45, 49). Seitz 
testified that the man, who was approximately 6'2" tall, 
approached her with a prescription for "percoceth" for a "James 
Brooks" that was signed by a doctor "Darrel Olson" (3/14/95 Tr. 
44-45). She testified that she became suspicious that the 
prescription was forged because percocet was misspelled (3/14/95 
Tr. at 44). However, before the police arrived or the medication 
was given, the man left the store (3/14/95 Tr. at 45). Ollerton 
testified that the man left the store and drove away in a cherry 
red sports car (3/14/95 Tr. at 49) which looked similar to the 
photograph of Jacques' car (Exhibit 2) he was shown at trial 
(3/14/95 Tr. 50-51). 
Chuck Senn testified that the prescription (Exhibit 1) had 
18-20 points of common identification with the handwriting sample 
which Jacques submitted per court order; and therefore, despite 
his belief that Jacques had deliberately changed his writing 
style on the submitted sample, Senn testified that the same 
individual wrote both the sample and the prescription (3/14/95 
Tr. at 132-33, 148). 
Senn also compared the prescription with writings 
authenticated by Sherry Ragan and found all 32 points of 
identification which led to his conclusion that the prescription 
and all of the writings identified by Ragan were likewise written 
by the same person (3/14/95 Tr. at 131-32, 134). 
Jacques asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a 
17 
reasonable doubt that he was the person who did make or utter a 
forged prescription for a controlled substance. Bateman was the 
only witnessed who directly identified Jacques; and he identified 
Jacques only as the individual whom he examined on September 26, 
1994. Ollerton and Seitz testified only that a "black man" came 
to the Art City Pharmecy on September 27, 1994. Moreover, 
Ollerton was unable to positively identify Jacques car as the car 
that the suspect left the pharmecy in. In addition, neither 
Bateman or Olson ever saw Jacques take a prescription pad from 
one of the IHC clinics. Jacques maintains that Senn's testimony 
that the prescription and the handwriting sample had 18-20 points 
of common identity is insufficient to establish identification. 
Therefore, Jacques requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction because the evidence introduced at trial is 
"sufficiently inconclusive" and that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Jacques requests that this Court reverse his conviction 
because the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime for 
which he was convicted. Alternatively Jacques requests that this 
Court vacate his conviction because the trial court abused its 
discretion in allowing deputy county attorney Sherry Ragan to 
give nonexpert opinion on handwriting under Rule 901 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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n-RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L / day of December, 1995. 
Margaret/ Lindsay 
Attorney for Jacques 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies of 
Appellant's Brief to: Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^ / day of 
December, 1995. 
/^^yiM^yth sfas^ 
19 
Tabl 
SANPETE VALLEY HOSPITAL and MEDICAL CUNI 
Robert D. Armetong, M.D. 
DEANo AA2726365 
Bruce Burnham, MJX 
DEANo. AB7577844 
Jan C. Jonson, PA-C 
-Certified 
Kim A Bateman, M.D.
 % 
DEANo AB6656409 
Gene E. Speakmanv M.D. 
DEANo AS1639826 
Mwhl Faafe CB^c Q 
159 North Main "v-
Ma*.Ut~*4642 
99 Sootb Main , 
4 -Ephi 
^Moroni Medical C B S c * Q 
394 Eatft IWTSoSh^ ' ™ 
Moroni, UT 84646 
436-8271 
Mt. Pleasant Family 
Health Cantor 
1100 South Medical Drive 
Mt Pkosant, UT 84647 
462 3471 
Tab 2 
Springville Police Dept. 
Sprinaville, Utoli 
HANDWRITING SPECIMEN 
TUBS' 
City 
CfeM 
State 
IX 
Place of Birth 
Date of Birth Age 
r^v\cA\K^\iA^^v\NL 
Case No. 
Office 
Arthur Bob Charles 
lyTUnrfif t^C.^UES 
Don Edward Frank 
Height 
aw 
Color of Eyes 
£>m)i\j 
Weight 
51 
Color of Hair 
Build George Henry Imlg 
Place of Employment (or last employment) 
Right or Left Handed Q^=.ftK(r9. \ to f rV \ \^ \Cy 
John Kenneth Lamb v 
• W ^ E - W ^ ^ V-<\Vy\Q 
Occupation or Trade Social Security No. Mary Nan Olson 
Name of Nearest Relative Relation 
Paul QueniJn Robert 
Address 
WRITE - DO NOT PRINT - CAPITAL A N D SMALL LETTERS 
..A...a...C....L...H...£.^...A..._l.-J. 
Samuel Tom Umphrey 
A B C D E F Q H I J 
5.-.L---..'v.L-bi-.0...P....Cl...^..5...X 
Vernon Will Xavier \ \ 
V£S^§^ W H - X V M \ ^ L 
K L M N O P Q R S T Volanda Ziffman 
.(JL_.Y.__W—_*____f_-7r- ^CA _KW h PV LNCCW;^ 
u v w x v z 1234 N. East Ave. tS.W. 
A-.-b....c..._d....^....?....3....k...\....sl. \^3VA ^-toX KM £' ^ \ A 
X — J . . . _fY?i »D 0_ 
' 9 h I J 
X—S—I. 
5678 S. West Blvd., N.W. 
^Vc-iq <b XA^^r 9>LM^ V\ \^ 
n o 
.Vj 
.Ad...A...i. 
P Q 
2, 
r s t 9012 E. North PL, S.E. 
u v w x 
3456 W. Soutn St., N.E. \ i^> 
S ^ 
4 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 10 
xik 
3 ^ ^ ^ fa^-Vy^ <j-v ^ 
iM .^ *4r 
The above is a specimen of my handwriting prepared freely and voluntarily. 
Date 
-3-.-Y^jV=> 
Witnessed by 
Qa4e-w"itnessed _ ^ 
Signature 
Exemplars of (Print Name, First, Initial) 
Year Born Race Sex 
Springville Police Dept. 
Springville, Utah 
HANDWRITING SPECIMEN 
MONTHS OF THE YEAR 
tf> 
page 2 
•January J&Y^i^v. M^ 
February £p><0 IfrSkM 
V 
March J M ^ C L 
April A ^ A 
May. 
June 
J u l y C A / W ; 
September. 
October ^ •^9^3-
\ 
August 
WRITE THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS 
4321 
8675. 
4679 ^v/>\ 9010 °\0\^ 
la^ 9237 ^ y A 8453. °>\^ 5583. ^ ^ 
7197 i\°n 8076. ^AU 5814 B ^ 1585 v=AS 
SPELZ. OUT THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS 
One Seven Sixty "mVN 
TwoJS^L Eight V ^ C N ^ X 
T h r e e H j ^ ^ k ; 
Pn..r C ^ < V 9 ~ -
Fivft C A \ ) K ^ 
Six^Vb 
N i n e ^ V ^ J 
Ten. 
Fifteen V \ ^ V F , ^ V 
Tu/anty \ V ^ . ^ N I X ^ 
Thirtwan \ Vv\'<v-A^-^r ^ 
Forty V > ^ > X ^ 
-b 
Twelve Thirty. ^ 
K U ^ 
\ t ^ c^ .^gL, 
\ \ \^\\^\\o^ 
V^v QV^ 
l^\e.\3\o 
Signature 
V^iv^ VIWKUQ ^ V c - \ ^ - ^ o T« Witnessed 
Tab 3 
ArmmM w ^  firw, amy ^ ^ 
flaw, im* ?4-(*ob 
j ft C&lTcCxL- T/MS Fficrtt-
Mil 
Aifi>yoyj^u>y#L/TY Gxc rtfe: l#u) /!/£> ft*/£- TH^ 
you( Tfr&Ct/tCMtr coutv -nLAAiJc-etpr OF TH€ CJ/TA^SS 
A k&te&dA gte- 2)&F&fi&e 6Jmt THE' cou^nn^^au^. 
_ „ _ _ 
1 ^ 
c 
A ^ o 
__ 
_ 
— 
_„^k^ 
^ < - _ : ' 
~ 
Qa&fU£ &-¥-1<i 
V 
-
-
Tab 4 
f' I • > , ,U ^ ' . i if 
Tab 5 
,r I •^l.m-r<t>yl t n ^ w m ^ ^ , , ^ , , <<j :« ; : :^1E:^y,yr l „ 4pW;MM;::ry—fJ|y n n ^ ^ ^ ^ - j p p - - ^ ^ — ^ p ^ 1P3r/C~ j^^—y-^ ^ ( "X/ sJ ^ 
us dM (J£(J/iU.y 2>&te/3zl 
!&&&*}& F/£&r ZZJ3?J7At~ Pff&-€#flJ£££ OF jmC&&Id* 
)SS 
" •• - \ ' c € U ~ £ H ) 
.. r t e * of the Fourth District Court 
• . <' ,-«. 1c hsroby certify that the 
•s j? tno and fu" ccp/ of an 
. - . . ; : . - . - ' rs;ficQ as SL»ch CJsrk. 
( nar J Znd searf of said Court this /9Z ^0*^.^ X . \ 
JTTrrg of~~(rr/)# MOT/OAJ fb/Z- *77&AA24Z'£//*7-£0A) 
STATE OF UTAH ^ 
c 0 , _ . v r / ot UT&*-' ) . o. l h e Fnurth DW 5 
t -.-•!''•"''"' .' , horaby cor* 
el •' • 
• » " • • • * I * ' 
sa-ci Coir » 
day oi 
crrwt do/sly 
/40T/0A) 
/)(j£ rd /#£ fep&dHAir £T*To£rJ4//} #& /£* eae/ezzr&y 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
r, -r.'o'UTA'H ) . „ . » , . 
•••-:.-;..•• Ork d the Fourth District Court 
V .-. «Je hzTBb-J sort.'-. »' *<*•'• ^ / ' . ? / ' '. 
( .5. SMITH. OHT^n \ i o f W 1$ / £ I 
t 
i 
! 
| Jlti&Z' 6>Oy <&O£/K/0&tt>4/77 
